FW: An intelligent approach

["Tim Ewers" <tewers@uidaho.edu>]

This recently came across my email.  I am curious to hear your responses ...

 

Friends:  This was written by a West Point graduate, Richard Kidd, who
spent a lot of time in Afganistan.  His comments are addressed to his
fellow West Point grads, but I decided not edit out any of the "insider"
statements; those spots are obvious. His insights are well worth your
time to read.  Of course, he is not addressing that part of the war that
will take place within the US.    Denny Gillem

Many of you are probably not aware that I was one of the last American
citizens to have spent a great deal of time in Afghanistan.  I was first
there in 1993, providing relief and assistance to refugees along the
Tajik border, and in this capacity have traveled all along the border
region between the two countries.

In 1998 and 1999, I was the Deputy Program Manager for the UN's mine
action program in Afghanistan.  This program is the largest civilian
employer in the country with over 5,000 persons clearing mines and UXO.
In this later capacity, I was somewhat ironically engaged in a "Holy
War," as decreed by the Taliban, against the evil of landmines; and by a
special proclamation of Mullah Omar, all those who might have died in
this effort were considered to be "martyrs" -- even an "infidel" like
myself.

The mine action program is the most respected relief effort in the
country, and because of this I had the opportunity to travel extensively
without too much interference or restriction.  I still have extensive
contacts in the area and among the Afghan community and read a great
deal on the subject.

I had wanted to write earlier and share some of my perspectives, but
quite frankly, I have been a bit too popular in DC this past week and
have not had time.  Dr. Tony Kern's comments were excellent and I would
like to use them as a basis for sharing some observations.

First, he is absolutely correct.  This war is about will, resolve and
character.  I want to touch on that later, but first I want to share
some comments about our "enemy."

Our enemy is not the people of Afghanistan.  The country is devastated
beyond what most of us can imagine.  The vast majority of the people
live day-to-day, hand-to-mouth in abject conditions of poverty, misery
and deprivation.  Less than 30% of the men are literate, the women even
less.  The country is exhausted, and desperately wants something like
peace. They know very little of the world at large, and have no access
to information or knowledge that would counter what they are being told
by the Taliban.  They have nothing left, nothing that is except for
their pride.

Who is our enemy?  Well, our enemy is a group of non-Afghans, often
referred to by the Afghans as "Arabs" and a fanatical group of religious
leaders and their military cohort, the Taliban.  The non-Afghan
contingent came from all over the Islamic world to fight in the war
against the Russians. Many came using a covert network created with
assistance by our own government.

OBL (as Osama bin Laden was referred to by us in the country at the
time) restored this network to bring in more fighters, this time to
support the Taliban in their civil war against the former Mujehdeen.
Over time, this military support along with financial support has
allowed OBL and his "Arabs" to co-opt significant government activities
and leaders.  OBL is the "inspector general" of Taliban armed forces;
his bodyguards protect senior Talib leaders, and he has built a system
of deep bunkers for the Taliban, which were designed to withstand cruise
missile strikes (uhm, where did he learn to do that?).  His forces
basically rule the southern city of Kandahar.

This high-profile presence of OBL and his "Arabs" has, in the last 2
years or so, started to generate a great deal of resentment on the part
of the local Afghans.  At the same time, the legitimacy of the Taliban
regime has started to decrease as it has failed to end the war, as local
humanitarian conditions have worsened and as "cultural" restrictions
have become even harsher.

It is my assessment that most Afghans no longer support the Taliban.
Indeed the Taliban have recently had a very difficult time getting
recruits for their forces and have had to rely more and more on
non-Afghans, either from Pushtun tribes in Pakistan or from OBL.  OBL
and the Taliban, absent any US action, were probably on their way to
sharing the same fate that all other outsiders and outside doctrines
have experienced in Afghanistan -- defeat and dismemberment.

During the Afghan war with the Soviets, much attention was paid to the
martial prowess of the Afghans.  We were all at West Point at the time,
and most of us had high-minded idealistic thoughts about how we would
all want to go help the brave "freedom fighters" in their struggle
against the Soviets.

Those concepts were naive to the extreme.  The Afghans, while never
conquered as a nation, are not invincible in battle.  A "good" Afghan
battle is one that makes a lot of noise and light.  Basic military
skills are rudimentary and clouded by cultural constraints that no
matter what, a warrior should never lose his honor.  Indeed, firing from
the prone is considered distasteful (but still done).

Traditionally, the Afghan order of battle is very feudal in nature, with
fighters owing allegiance to a "commander," and this person owing
allegiance upwards and so on and so on.  Often such allegiance is
secured by payment.  And while the Taliban forces have changed this
somewhat, many of the units in the Taliban army are there because they
are being paid to be there.  All such groups have very strong loyalties
along ethnic and tribal lines.

Again, the concept of having a place of "honor" and "respect" is of
paramount importance and blood feuds between families and tribes can
last for generations over a perceived or actual slight.  That is one
reason why there were 7 groups of Mujehdeen fighting the Russians.  It
is a very difficult task to form and keep united a large bunch of
Afghans into a military formation.  The "real" stories that have come
out of the war against the Soviets are very enlightening and a lot
different from our fantastic visions as cadets.

When the first batch of Stingers came in and were given to one Mujehdeen
group, another group -- supposedly on the same side -- attacked the
first group and stole the Stingers, not so much because they wanted to
use them, but because having them was a matter of prestige.

Many larger coordinated attacks that advisers tried to conduct failed
when all the various Afghan fighting groups would give up their assigned
tasks (such as blocking or overwatch) and instead would join the assault
group in order to seek glory.

In comparison to Vietnam, the intensity of combat and the rate of
fatalities were lower for all involved.

As you can tell from above, it is my assessment that these guys are not
THAT good in a purely military sense and the "Arabs" probably even less
so than the Afghans.  So why is it that they have never been conquered?
It goes back to Dr. Kern's point about will.

During their history, the only events that have managed to form any
semblance of unity among the Afghans, is the desire to fight foreign
invaders.  And in doing this, the Afghans have been fanatical.  The
Afghans' greatest military strength is the ability to endure hardships
that would, in all probability, kill most Americans and enervate the
resolve of all but the most elite military units.

The physical difficulties of fighting in Afghanistan, the terrain, the
weather, and the harshness are all weapons that our enemies will use to
their advantage and use well.  (NOTE: For you military planner types and
armchair generals: around November 1st, most road movement is
impossible, in part because all the roads used by the Russians have been
destroyed and air movement will be problematic at best).  Also, those
fighting us are not afraid to fight.  OBL and others do not think the US
has the will or the stomach for a fight.  Indeed after the absolutely
inane missile strikes of 1998, the overwhelming consensus was that we
were cowards who would not risk one life in face-to-face combat.

Rather than demonstrating our might and acting as a deterrent, that
action and others of the not so recent past, have reinforced the
perception that the US does not have any "will" and that we are morally
and spiritually corrupt.

Our challenge is to play to the weaknesses of our enemy, notably their
propensity for internal struggles, the distrust between the
extremists/Arabs and the majority of Afghans, their limited ability to
fight coordinated battles, and their lack of external support.  More
importantly through is that we have to take steps not to play to their
strengths, which would be to unite the entire population against us by
increasing their suffering or killing innocents, to get bogged down
trying to hold terrain, or to get into a battle of attrition chasing up
and down mountain valleys.

I have been asked how I would fight the war.  This is a big question and
well beyond my pay grade or expertise.  And while I do not want to
second guess current plans or start an academic debate, I would share
the following from what I know about Afghanistan and the Afghans.

First, I would give the Northern Alliance a big wad of cash so that they
can buy off a chunk of the Taliban army before winter.  Second, also
with this cash, I would pay some guys to kill some of the Taliban
leadership, making it look like an inside job to spread distrust and
build on existing discord.  Third I would support the Northern alliance
with military assets, but not take it over or adopt so high a profile as
to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of most Afghans.

Fourth would be to give massive amounts of humanitarian aid and
assistance to the Afghans in Pakistan in order to demonstrate our
goodwill and to give these guys a reason to live rather than the choice
between dying of starvation or dying fighting the "infidel."  Fifth,
start a series of public works projects in areas of the country not
under Taliban control (these are much more than the press reports) again
to demonstrate goodwill and that improvements come with peace.  Sixth, I
would consider very carefully putting any female service members into
Afghanistan proper -- sorry to the females of
our class but within that culture a man who allows a women to fight for
him has zero respect, and we will need respect to gain the cooperation
of Afghan allies.  No Afghan will work with a man who fights with
women.

I would hold off from doing anything too dramatic in the new term,
keeping a low level of covert action and pressure up over the winter,
allowing this pressure to force open the fissions around the Taliban
that were already developing -- expect that they will quickly turn on
themselves and on OBL.

We can pick up the pieces next summer, or the summer after.  When we do
"pick up" the pieces, I would make sure that we do so on the ground,
"man to man."

While I would never want to advocate American causalities, it is
essential that we communicate to OBL and all others watching that we can
and will "engage and destroy the enemy in close combat."  As mentioned
above, we should not try to gain or hold terrain, but Infantry
operations against the enemy are essential.  There can be no excuses
after the defeat or lingering doubts in the minds of our enemies
regarding American resolve and nothing, nothing will communicate this
except for ground combat.

And once this is all over, unlike in 1989, the US must provide continued
long-term economic assistance to rebuild the country.

While I have written too much already, I think it is also important to
share a few things on the subject of brutality.  Our opponents will not
abide by the Geneva conventions.  There will be no prisoners unless
there is a chance that they can be ransomed or made part of a local
prisoner exchange.

During the war with the Soviets, videotapes were made of communist
prisoners having their throats slit.  Indeed, there did exist a "trade"
in prisoners so that souvenir videos could be made by outsiders to take
home with them.

This practice has spread to the Philippines, Bosnia and Chechnya where
similar videos are being made today and can be found on the web for
those so inclined.  We can expect our soldiers to be treated the same
way.  Sometime during this war I expect that we will see videos of US
prisoners having their heads cut off.

Our enemies will do this not only to demonstrate their "strength" to
their followers, but also to cause us to overreact, to seek wholesale
revenge against civilian populations, and to turn this into the
world-wide religious war that they desperately want.

This will be a test of our will and of our character. (For further
collaboration of this type of activity please read Kipling).

This will not be a pretty war; it will be a war of wills, of resolve and
somewhat conversely of compassion and of a character.  Towards our
enemies, we must show a level of ruthlessness that has not been part of
our military character for a long time.  But to those who are not our
enemies we must show a level of compassion probably unheard of during
war.  We should do this not for humanitarian reasons, even though there
are many, but for shrewd military logic.

end