Risk Aversion

[Robert Probasco <rcp@uidaho.edu>]

RISK AVERSION AND THE ZERO DEFECTS CULTURE
By Lieutenant Colonel D. T. Eccles Royal Tank Regiment
Published in The British Army Review #114, 1998

At the time of writing I am four months into a tour of duty in Sarajevo
with Headquarters Implementation Force (HQ IFOR); which in essence is a
forward element of HQ AFSOUTH.  This has given me the opportunity to study
the military cultures of a number of countries (currently 34 different
nations contribute to IFOR) and that of the United States in particular.

What follows is not an attempt to denigrate America or Americans; rather,
because it is easier to identify in others characteristics which may be
all too present but unnoticed in ourselves, the intention is to sound a
warning note in respect of our own [military] culture. I have been struck
by four particular overlapping trends within the American military
culture:

* The first is their nervousness over the issue of force protection:  the
physical safety of their individual soldiers.  Of course, we are all
anxious to minimise the risks to our troops, but it is always a fine
balance between this and the imperative of the mission in hand.  I would
contend, and the majority of senior American officers to whom one listens
would also endorse privately that they have not got it quite right in
Bosnia.

Every single off base journey has to be made by four vehicles, the
soldiers must all wear their helmets and combat body armour and carry
their rifles.

This does anything but give the local people the impression that tension
is reduced and the country is returning to normality.  But the American
public, and hence Congress, is a victim of its own success during
Operation DESERT STORM and now believes that war can be waged without
incurring any casualties at all. For example, the US Centre for Naval
Analysis used to plan on the "51% Solution" in the Cold War days (how to
prevail, irrespective of the casualties).  Today it bases its analysis on
the "100% Requirement" (operations are to be so organized that there are
no casualties).

* The second strand is the way in which they are tied in knots over the
dictates of political correctness.  This ranges from the comical, for
example the title ADC (Aide de Camp) can no longer be used because of the
HIV connotation, whereby a person's promotion or appointment is based, not
necessarily on ability, but on racial origin or gender.  This has not been
helped by some well publicized scandals, such as the US Navy's Tailhook
Convention, but it is widely acknowledged that the civilian obsession with
political correctness has gone too far in the military.

* The third trend is the fear that officers have of the consequences of
the slightest personal administrative error, such as an inaccurate travel
claim.  Recently the Stars and Stripes (the American forces newspaper) had
splashed all over its front page the fact that SACEUR, GEN Joulwan, and
his wife were accused (by one of his own junior staff officers) of having
made an unauthorized journey on a US military aircraft.  This story was
completely unfounded but senior US officers have been dismissed for much
less. To be fair, this attitude is simply a manifestation of a wider
phenomenon throughout US public life.

* The final strand is the reluctance that some officers display to
disagree with their superiors, even way in advance of the point of
decision.  Anecdotal examples of the effective termination of careers for
displays of dissent from the opinion of senior officers present are
legion.  Consequently, independent thought and formal debate is the
exception rather than the rule and, in public, a bland and rather
unhealthy consensus prevails.

        These four trends have combined to produce an intolerance for
mistakes or what is known as a "zero defect culture" within the American
military.  Consequently many decisions must now be referred to higher
authority.  For example, nowadays it is quite common for every soldier's
leave pass to be approved personally by the Battalion Commander.  A more
serious consequence perhaps than the inefficiency that this imposes on the
system is the creation of a culture of risk aversion.

Generations of US officers are growing up without being encouraged to
exercise any autonomous authority and with little instruction in how to
assess and then be prepared to take risks in pursuance of a military
objective. Thus there is an erosion of the key virtue which underpins
every military organisation: the moral courage to take risks.

         This article is not written to belittle the Americans.  The
shortcomings I have identified above are certainly not reflected in the
performance of every officer and indeed they are all extremely competent
within their own fields of expertise.  Furthermore the operation in which
we are currently engaged is unfamiliar to the US and their approach to it
is thoroughly professional.  

I stress again that this is an attempt to alert us to an insidious process
that may well be going on within our own Armed Services.  We have all seen
shades or elements of what I have described above in our own military
organisations.  I propose no solution:  I simply raise a flag.